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Critical Intersections and Comic Possibilities: Extending Racialized 
Critical Rhetorical Scholarship 
Jonathan P. Rossing∗  
Communication scholars conducting work on race must engage work from complementary critical communities to bolster their 
own critiques and further advance progressive racial coalitions. Critical, rhetorical scholarship and Critical Race Theory 
(CRT) share principle aims that provide significant ground for interdisciplinary racial projects. Together, these interrelated 
disciplines can find reinforcement in comedic discourse. This essay locates racial comedy as a space for transformational 
critiques. More specifically, the author argues that critical rhetorical scholarship and CRT taken jointly can illuminate 
parallel comic discourses and advance their important correctives pertaining to race and racism.  
Introduction 
ace saturates everyday life in the form of dynamic, racialized symbols and performances that
circulate in public culture. These messages shape racial ideologies, influence race consciousness, 
and inescapably impact civic judgment and action ranging from the personal and mundane to the 
institutional and cultural.1 Speaking to the complexity of racial discourse, Howard Winant and Michael 
Omi put it simply: “Racial hegemony is ‘messy.’”2 As such, a web of competing discourses animates 
racial tensions and contradictions that citizens often have difficulty putting into words, let alone resolving. 
Incidents such as Professor Henry Louis Gates’ arrest, tragedies such as Hurricane Katrina, and 
controversies such as the Jena Six case in Louisiana illustrate the vexing consequences of racial discourse 
in public culture. In such instances, deeply ingrained beliefs and habits surrounding race complicate 
inescapable power relations and yet often spark progressive accounts of racialized experience in public 
discourse. For example, then-Senator Barack Obama’s speech on race entitled, “A More Perfect Union,” 
prudently navigated the uncertainties and contours of racial meaning and experience in United States 
culture.3 Within this culture of competing racial discourses, citizens must regularly contend with what 
Lisa Flores and Dreama Moon call the “racial paradox,” wherein racial ideologies and identities are 
socially and politically constructed.4 However when these ideologies take hold in public consciousness, 
they create undeniable material realities. Consequently, we cannot simply eliminate race or racialized 
beliefs, nor from a critical stance can we tolerate essentializing, dehumanizing constructions. 
Communication scholars in general and rhetorical scholars in particular are uniquely equipped to 
address the racial paradox because the study of rhetoric seeks to understand how public culture and 
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discourse mediate social meaning, knowledge, judgment, and civic performance.5 Kent Ono and John 
Sloop warn, however, that a critic errs if she “believe[s] herself to be competent at rendering a significant, 
if important, self-critique without outside help” as if she were an “all-powerful center.” They argue 
instead, “criticism should be moved nearer to the social and cultural communities from which criticism 
derives.”6 To this end, some communication scholars enact what Marouf Hasian and Fernando Delgado 
call “racialized critical rhetorical theorizing” with a commitment to interdisciplinary intersections with 
critical race theory (CRT).7 Working from this foundation, I build on previous efforts to position CRT in 
communication scholarship to further illuminate how racial realities can be analyzed and ideally 
transformed through discursive critique. My primary interest in doing so is to continue moving criticism 
closer to pre-existing critical, cultural communities by enlisting help from popular culture texts such as 
political humor. More specifically, turning serious attention to the perspectives in racial comedy will help 
critical, rhetorical race theorists advance their critiques and expand the struggle for social justice to new 
cultural fronts. 
My argument proceeds in two parts. First, I identify principle orientations and goals that critical 
rhetoric and critical race scholarship share. Second, I present a case analysis of a satiric, mock-editorial 
by Stephen Colbert on The Colbert Report in which Colbert addresses the debates surrounding Supreme 
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation.8 Positioned as critical racial comedy, this comic text 
invites the audience to examine the “multiple and contradictory undercurrents that have racial 
overtones” in the debate over Sotomayor’s judicial neutrality.9 Through this analysis I illustrate how 
sustained engagement between rhetorical scholarship and CRT functions to address racial oppression 
and simultaneously work toward positive social transformation. Of importance to note is that when these 
disciplines join together with critical discourses such as racial comedy, they amplify the transformative 
messages in the comic texts.  
A Rhetorical View of Racial Culture 
Critical rhetoric performs politically oriented cultural criticism that aims to unmask discourses of 
power and interrogate hegemonic strategies of domination. This form of critique rejects universal 
standards of reason, celebrates contingency, and examines the intricate relationships among discourse, 
power, and knowledge.10 In a similar vein, Critical Race Theory (CRT) advances a radical understanding 
of law as a political, ideological, and racialized social institution that profoundly impacts the lived 
experiences of people of color.11 The origins, aims, and strategies of critical rhetoric and CRT present 
opportunities for reciprocal engagement. First, both fields share a concern for the ways communication 
informs attitudes and ideologies, orchestrates civic action, and consequently, impacts racialized realities. 
Communication Law Review 
Volume 10, Issue 1 
 
  12 
For this reason, both disciplines illuminate the often overlooked features of racialized public culture. 
Second, critical rhetoric and CRT accent the human capacity to resist essentialized notions of race and 
transform cultural attitudes and habits. They promote intervention through rhetorical, performative 
practice. Third, both disciplines strive to navigate the racial paradox. They adeptly manage the difficult 
work of addressing a dynamic social construct with rigidified material consequences. I discuss these 
shared projects of critical rhetoric and CRT below. 
Communication and the Construction of Race 
Rhetorical scholarship and CRT reject race and racial meanings as biological reality, natural fact, 
or common sense. Instead both disciplines direct attention to the ways communication shapes racial 
reality. John Calmore explains, “Critical race theory begins with a recognition that ‘race’ is not a fixed 
term … [but] a fluctuating, decentered complex of social meanings that are formed and transformed 
under the constant pressures of political struggle.”12 Popular public discourses create racialized meanings, 
inform public attitudes about race, and influence race consciousness. In turn, these racialized ways of 
thinking and knowing guide civic interactions and complicate judgments in all facets of everyday life. For 
these reasons, critical race scholars demand careful attention to the “terms by which race and racism 
have been negotiated in American consciousness,” including but not limited to legal decisions, speeches, 
news reports, educational curricula, advertising images, popular music, and comedy.13 CRT’s 
examination of legal discourse specifically complements rhetorical scholarship that considers how 
discursive formations mediate meaning, power, and identity. Michael Calvin McGee summarizes the 
rhetorical view of culture shared by CRT in the following way: “[H]uman beings are ‘conditioned,’ not 
directly to belief and behavior, but to a vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons, 
or excuses for behavior and belief.”14 Thus, communication scholarship informed by critical race 
scholarship offers a powerful heuristic to examine the intersecting discourses that characterize and 
construct racial culture. 
Rhetorical scholarship and CRT strive to critique the unquestioned, unexamined characteristics 
of public culture through which racial reality becomes naturalized as common sense. Through repetition 
and reinforcement, dominant ideologies pertaining to race and racism gain currency and become deeply 
embedded in cultural rules, habits, assumptions, and discourses. For this reason, CRT promotes a self-
reflexive “race-consciousness” and an understanding of the ways legal discourse informs our 
understandings, actions, and interactions.15 Likewise, critical rhetoric promotes skills and sensibilities 
necessary to confront racial injustice on the “surfaces of society,” including the public discourses we 
amplify, social identities we privilege, available ranges of action we constitute, cultural myths we circulate, 
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and texts in which we encode racial meaning and ideology.16 Thus both rhetoric and CRT scholars 
pursue projects that “examine and attend to the specifics of race, as it emerges in concrete conflicts and 
practices, communities and culture” in order to reveal and interrogate the rhetorical strategies, discursive 
practices, and cultural attitudes sustaining racial injustice.17 
Reconstructive Power of Communication 
Both disciplines also promote rhetorical intervention by emphasizing citizens’ capacity to alter 
and reinvent the racialized discourses that inform our everyday lives. Critical race theorists strive to 
amplify marginalized voices so that new narratives and experiences become significant in public discourse 
and inform civic judgment.18 For instance, T. Alexander Aleinikoff argues that “the story that America 
tells about itself” ensures people of color remain “strangers,” positioned as “outsiders” with a “badge of 
otherness.” Aleinikoff suggests reframing contemporary narratives of United States history to highlight 
the stories not of immigrants who chose America, but of those who built America—collective stories 
incorporating the narratives of slaves, free blacks working in factories, women in factories and the home, 
Chinese railroad workers, and Mexican crop harvesters.19 Such revision of dominant socio-political 
narratives may remedy lingering problems of racial exclusion and injustice because new, inclusive myths 
give value and status to traditionally marginalized citizens. CRT also strives to redefine ideologically 
infused terms that shape racial meaning and interactions such as the “substance of freedom,” to create a 
conception of freedom that rejects any “right to degrade and humiliate another human being.”20 Such an 
ideographic analysis seeks to understand the ideologies circulating in public discourse so as to create new 
relationships and knowledge for common terms that might positively influence political consciousness.21  
These projects challenge existing discursive patterns and reinvent cultural knowledge in efforts to 
move citizens toward more just democratic practices. These projects participate in the “to and fro of 
assembly and disassembly” as they define, create, and contest cultural formations. They transform race 
consciousness by integrating a broad range of voices, experiences, and interests.22 In other words, the 
rhetorical ventures taken up by CRT recognize that the “artful deployment of language … has real 
effects upon language itself, upon meaning, and finally upon what humans do.”23 This constructive power 
of rhetoric and its emphasis on civic intervention is valuable to scholars dedicated not only to 
deconstructing oppressive conditions but also to constituting new, just communities. 
Navigating Racial Paradoxes 
The aforementioned intersections of critical rhetoric and CRT give rise to another intersection. 
Although the terrain of race is unstable, dominant racial discourse nevertheless constructs oppressive 
realities to which citizens must respond. In the midst of the contingencies of racial constructions, both 
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disciplines stress the need to move purposefully toward a just future. Ian F. Haney López’s White by Law 
models scholarship contending with this racial paradox. López reveals the complex legal construction of 
racial meanings and consciousness in United States’ racial culture, and he challenges the consequences of 
these constructions.24 López examines racial prerequisite cases that constructed racial boundaries as they 
determined conditions for United States citizenship. Through often contradictory rulings, judges and 
legal practitioners defined citizenship according to different manifestations of whiteness and then 
rationalized whiteness as a natural, pre-existing category proven by scientific and common knowledge. 
The ramifications of the legal construction of racial identity carried far-reaching social, political, and 
economic consequences, privileging a white consciousness that marked non-white “others” as unworthy, 
undesirable, and unfit for citizenship. Legal discourses on whiteness and citizenship determined migration 
decisions, neighborhood development, job opportunities, and wealth distribution. These cases even 
shaped the physical appearance of the United States populace because court decisions influenced 
courtship, marriage, and reproduction. López’s work clearly emphasizes the constructed and contingent 
reality of race and also how these constructions carry significant, material consequences. Thus his work 
models a sensibility necessary to act purposefully in the midst of this racial paradox. 
Like CRT, rhetorical scholarship is well-suited for navigating these contradictory and complex 
racial formations because of its emphasis on the social construction of truth, contingent knowledge, and 
the material realities racial formations produce. Rhetorical invention maintains a foundation for 
judgment and performance while recognizing this foundation as temporary and alterable. Rhetorical 
critics recognize that judgment occurs “in the face of contingency, with countless uncertainties, and 
incredible consequences.”25 In other words, rhetorical criticism is suited to work with the paradox of 
racial constructions and consequences; it is well-equipped to navigate and orchestrate action amidst 
dynamic racial realities. Thus, critical rhetorical scholarship complements critical race scholarship as they 
both strive to remedy the tensions of racialized culture without deferring to whiteness as the invisible 
status quo. 
Comic Possibilities for Rhetorical Criticism 
The previous section illustrates shared ventures and orientations which facilitate careful 
engagement between critical rhetoricians and race theorists. In this section I expand the scope of this 
interdisciplinarity and accent another opportunity for supplementing critical, rhetorical race scholarship 
with criticism already circulating in popular culture. Sloop and Ono stress, “[A]ll critics interested in 
public political change” have a responsibility “to investigate the judgments and forms of judgment that 
operate materially in various communities and subcommunities in contemporary culture” and to engage 
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existing critical discourses.26 While humor may be an unlikely path to social and racial justice, comedy 
provides a valuable popular discourse that scholars and educators should utilize to their pedagogical 
advantage.27 In particular, I argue that communication scholars must give serious attention to racial 
comic discourses complementing the shared attitudes and aims outlined above. 
To be sure, throughout United States history some discourses passing as “comedy” have worsened 
racial tensions and actively reinforced anti-democratic attitudes. While such comedy offers pause, it does 
not constitute sufficient ground to dismiss the reconstructive and inventive potential of racial comedy.28 
Because comedy exaggerates features of our everyday life it reveals overlooked tensions and 
contradictions. Simon Critchley argues that comedy requires congruence between jokes and social 
structure so that the comic reflections of society and culture will help audiences see “the familiar 
defamiliarized, the ordinary made extraordinary and the real rendered surreal.”29 In other words, 
comedy shows us what humans have created, yet accepted as natural and given. Popular humor 
complements critical rhetorical scholarship on race because it reveals racialized constructions and their 
material impact on actions, judgments, knowledge, and power relationships. Additionally, comedy 
models a process of intervention and reconstruction of discursive patterns and practices. The earliest 
comic poets sought to “influence public thinking about matters of major importance” and provoked the 
audience “to think about their lives and civic duties in ways not encouraged on other occasions.”30 
Finally, comedy works in the realms of contradiction and paradox, presenting guidelines to help the 
audience live within these inescapable conditions. Like rhetorical race scholarship, critical comedy 
recognizes and counters problematic racial constructions in U.S. culture. Furthermore, comedy offers an 
essential discourse that could guide citizens toward prudent civic judgments and just performances as 
they navigate complex relationships.31 In this vein, humor can serve a liberating function via critiques of 
democratic incongruities.  
The joint articulation of critical rhetoric and CRT promises to help communication scholars 
identify progressive comic perspectives with the capacity to help achieve racial justice. To illustrate how 
popular comic discourses complement CRT-inflected, critical rhetorical scholarship, I analyze a comic 
critique from faux-conservative news anchor Stephen Colbert on Comedy Central’s The Colbert Report. 
This case analysis illustrates how comic discourse strongly supplements critical rhetorical race 
scholarship. In his recurring mock-editorial segment “The Word,” Stephen Colbert commented on 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s sharply contested claim that life experiences inform and enrich 
judgment. Colbert’s editorial disputes familiar discourses of colorblindness and offers a counter-
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hegemonic critique of naturalized ideologies of whiteness. Thus, his comedy has the potential to disrupt 
dominant patterns of white consciousness.32 
Colbert begins his comedic commentary with an overview of the presumed problem of judicial 
bias: “Nation, I have never let past life experience get in the way of how I approach a situation. For 
instance, I don’t prejudge whether a hot stove will burn my hand. Who knows what will happen next 
time?” Colbert holds up his hand to reveal circular burn marks from a range-top. Contrary to his claim, 
his illustration seems to suggest that everyone is inescapably shaped by past experience and that we 
regularly call on past experience to make decisions. His burned hand suggests that ignoring life 
experiences in judgment is undesirable and imprudent because it may lead to serious consequences. “But 
listen to what Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor believes,” he continues. Colbert cuts to footage 
from Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings where she explains, “I can state what I believe very simply: life 
experiences help the process of listening and understanding an argument.” Colbert’s character scoffs at 
this supposed bias and sides with the “impartial senators” who attacked her position as “inconsistent with 
the impartial, neutral arbiter” a judge should embody. Concluding this background, he segues to the 
editorial segment: “Because of Sotomayor’s obvious ‘things-I-have-learned’ bias, the Supreme Court’s 
neutrality is in danger, which brings us to tonight’s Word: ‘Neutral Man’s Burden.’” The editorial title 
creatively imitates Rudyard Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden.”33 The metonym—replacing “white” 
with “neutral”—immediately transforms his warning that the “Supreme Court’s neutrality is in danger.” 
This substitution reminds the audience that the Supreme Court’s whiteness is in “danger” as well. 
Colbert’s implied defense of whiteness begins to raise questions about the racialized ideologies motivating 
opposition to Sotomayor. 
Colbert begins his editorial: “Folks, over the past 220 years the vast majority of our Supreme 
Court justices have been neutral, like Samuel Alito.” His emphasis on the code he revealed in the title 
again cues the audience to identify the double-meaning: the vast majority of justices have been white (and 
male). Demonstrating Justice Alito’s presumed neutrality, Colbert cuts to a clip of Alito’s 2006 
confirmation hearings where Alito explained, “When I get a case about discrimination, um, I have to 
think about people in my own family who suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or 
because of religion or, or because of gender … I do take that into account.” Like Colbert’s burned hand, 
this contradictory fragment directs attention to the inescapable partiality and positionality of judgment. 
Alito can no more escape the “things he has learned” as a white male, than Sotomayor can avoid 
incorporating similarly racialized experiences in her judgments as a Latina. In alignment with CRT and 
rhetorical scholarship, Colbert shows how inescapably racialized subject positions influence our 
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interpretations of and attitudes toward civic life. More pointedly, in a culture saturated with racial 
messages, our experiences necessarily induce specific civic judgments and promote particular actions in 
relation to race. Yet our perspectives are also always incomplete and partial.34 
Colbert’s ignores the blatant contradiction between his valuation of objectivity and Alito’s 
testimony. Instead, he affirms Alito’s statement as evidence of judicial neutrality: “Yes! He takes his life 
experiences into account. But he does it neutrally.” Colbert’s emphasis highlights the contradiction. How 
can Alito take his biases into account “neutrally?” Furthermore, why is Sotomayor denied the same 
privilege? Colbert’s comic incongruities invite the audience to recognize that claims to “neutrality” 
cannot escape rhetoricity or subjectivity.35 Alito’s testimony juxtaposed with critiques of Sotomayor’s so-
called “things-I-have-learned” bias prompts the audience to reflect on the fallacy of the attacks on 
Sotomayor’s presumably radical bias. This juxtaposition also provokes consideration for the unspoken 
racial dimensions motivating the debate. Utilizing critical racial commentary, Colbert moves forward in 
his critique by abandoning subtle hints at white subjectivity and naming the privileged position of 
whiteness. “So why is [Alito] neutral and not Sotomayor? It’s because Alito is white. In America, white is 
neutral.” The side bar offering a running meta-commentary on Colbert’s editorial states: “Fair’s fair.” This 
juvenile warrant hints at the injustice of marking whiteness and white racial consciousness as neutral 
while Sotomayor as a woman of color is marked as both a dangerous threat and as a person whose 
experiences should be silenced. 
Colbert attempts to corroborate his claim to white neutrality with examples ranging from 
everyday life to institutional practices; instead, his satirical illustrations illuminate white privilege and 
racial consciousness. First, he offers everyday examples of white privilege. “For years, Band-Aids came in 
only one color: white person. It’s standard person color. In fact, it is so standard that when I was a kid, in 
Crayola boxes it was the color called ‘flesh.’” The sidebar accompanying his argument offers a mock-
citation: “Source: Bureau of Whites and Measures.” Comedic instances such as these epitomize everyday 
privileges resulting from the presumed universality of whiteness, and reveal how cultural messages 
implicitly construct notions of normality and shape racial identity. Furthermore, his pun on the 
International Bureau of Weights and Measures underscores that presumptions of universality are neither 
natural, nor commonsensical. Rather, racial constructions and realities result, in part, from privileged 
access to institutional systems and cultural practices which grant whites the power to name realities and 
dictate cultural knowledge.36 
Next, Colbert explicitly gestures toward the problem of limited race-consciousness. “Most 
Americans accept this [pointing to the back of his hand] as neutral without thinking about it. And that is 
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why the decisions made by all those white justices were not affected by their experiences—because their 
life experiences were neutral. That led to neutral decisions.” The exaggerated emphasis on white as 
neutral chides citizens’ limited self-reflection which results in overlooking prominent biases. The sidebar 
again adds force to the comic critique by underscoring the inescapable positionality of white race-
consciousness with another play to make whiteness visible: “Landmark case: Eggshell v. Ecru.” The 
fictional court case emphasizes the necessarily valenced perspective of white citizens. Just as many shades 
of white exist, racialized attitudes, orientations, and experiences shade judgments and perspectives for all 
white citizens. Despite claims to race neutrality, we can escape neither the material realities of racial 
constructions nor our racialized performances. Speaking to and with the work of rhetorical and CRT 
scholars, Colbert unambiguously challenges the privileged neutrality of whiteness and refuses to let white 
identity persist as an unmarked political subjectivity. Amplifying unexamined white neutrality via 
comedy, he reveals the hegemonic practices that maintain white privilege and sustain racial injustice.  
Colbert extends his critique to institutional practices with reference to two Supreme Court cases: 
“Take the Dred Scott case. Those justices’ life experiences—being white men in pre-Civil War America, 
some of whom owned slaves—in no way influenced their decision that black people were property.” 
Again, the sidebar intensifies the unmasking of white consciousness and political subjectivity: “Judges’ 
Robes Were White.” First, he prominently features the conflict of interest and biased position of white 
slave owners as justices; then, he supplants traditional imagery of black-robed justices with reference to 
Klan garb. These reminders of racial realities and subject positions leave little room for the audience to 
embrace comfortably the presumed impartiality of whiteness. Then, Colbert moves to another Supreme 
Court case. “[The Justices’] personal backgrounds had nothing to do with the all-neutral court’s decision 
that it was legal to send Japanese Americans to internment camps in 1942. Imagine how the life 
experience of an Asian judge would sully that neutrality.” Colbert revisits the “all-neutral court” 
metonym, marking once again the strategic rhetoric of white invisibility.37 These legal examples reveal 
the consequences of presumed white neutrality as they highlight the racialized perspective of white 
justices whose life experiences and biases impacted decisions that legitimated anti-democratic exclusion. 
As such whiteness emerges as a salient political subjectivity that impacts judgment. In addition, Colbert 
offers implicit support for Judge Sotomayor’s contested claim that lived experience in a marginalized 
position might yield more just, prudent judgments. With an invitation to imagine the judgment of an 
Asian American judge deciding Korematsu v. United States, Colbert prompts the audience to take the 
position of another and consider marginalized perspectives. Although he decries the way his hypothetical 
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Justice might “sully” the court’s neutrality, this comic incongruity in alignment with CRT provokes the 
audience to respect how the inclusion of broader perspectives might inspire more just judgments. 
Although performing a reactionary colorblindness in his discussion of these cases, Colbert 
undermines ideals of colorblindness and race neutrality with his comic juxtapositions. He rejects a typical 
colorblind narrative that rewrites history “into concrete and disparate moments in which such horrors as 
slavery and the internment occurred” but which remain “moments of the past, not the present.”38 In the 
examples above, Colbert brings past injustices to bear on the present when he accents the historical 
whiteness of the Supreme Court and the consequences of its long-standing racial exclusion. Recurring 
reminders that the highest court continues to be dominated by white justices are juxtaposed to 
discriminatory rulings resulting, in part, from the racial consciousness of white justices. This deliberate 
introduction of past legal and racial bias together with his previous examples of everyday privilege 
highlights the contemporary exclusion of marginalized perspectives in all registers of civic life. 
Before he concludes his editorial, Colbert acknowledges Sotomayor’s remarkable personal history, 
but he warns, “If that compelling, humble, strong, admirable life story in any way informs her judgment, 
she will destroy our nation.” Articulating overwhelmingly positive attributes with the fear of national 
decay implicitly raises questions about the racial dimension of the challenges to Sotomayor. Thus Colbert 
extends a subtle invitation to “ask the other question” and investigate the coded racial and gendered 
attitudes underlying these debates.39 More specifically his commentary sparks a vital question, why the 
opposition to a “humble, strong, admirable,” Latina nominee? Clearly, the dispute over Sotomayor’s 
confirmation represents more than a fight over perceived judicial bias. Operating from a rhetorical 
standpoint infused with CRT, these discourses reflect ongoing themes such as defending whiteness, 
protecting privilege, and perpetuating democratic exclusion.  
Conceding that Judge Sotomayor’s confirmation is almost guaranteed, Colbert offers his closing 
comment and returns to his previous illustration of everyday racial privilege: 
[T]he best we can hope is to neutralize her personal background—the way Band-Aids did 
when they reached out to minorities. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, 
‘After hearing calls to make Band-Aids more inclusive of varying skin tones, the company 
released its sheer Band-Aid.’ So in addition to white Band-Aids, we also have invisible Band-
Aids. Problem solved! [The sidebar critiques: ‘Or at Least Band-Aided.’] The same goes 
for the court. If you’re a white male like Sam Alito, naturally everything that happened in 
your life just helps make you a completely neutral, objective person. But—if you’re Sonia 
Sotomayor, everything that happened in your life should be invisible. And that’s the 
Word. 
With each turn in his editorial, Colbert amplifies markers of privilege, which render people of color 
invisible, from Band-Aids and crayon colors to a history of Supreme Court cases reflecting white race 
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consciousness and the covertly racialized reactions to Judge Sotomayor’s statement. Colbert’s maneuvers 
remind the audience that colorblind, race-neutral orientations are anything but. Instead, discourses of 
neutrality mute experiences of people of color and ignore realities of racial injustice while maintaining 
and protecting whiteness. This comic critique resonates with Cheryl Harris’ analysis of whiteness as a “set 
of assumptions, privileges, and benefits that accompany the status of being white.” In addition, Colbert’s 
reference to the Supreme Court cases demonstrates how racialized values and meanings “have been 
affirmed, legitimated, and protected by law” and result in the subordination and erasure of people of 
color.40 Meanwhile, his attention to the surface appearances and strategic maneuvers of whiteness reveals 
the ways that public culture and everyday practices construct and reinforce racialized realities and 
attitudes. Like rhetorical scholarship and CRT, Colbert “expose[s] whiteness as a cultural construction,” 
reveals “the strategies that embed its centrality,” and challenges its “influential political position.”41 
Carrie Crenshaw argues, “[R]hetorical silence about whiteness sustains an ideology of white privilege,” 
and Colbert comically rejects and successfully disrupts “whiteness’ rhetorical silence.”42 As such, he 
magnifies the often overlooked maneuvers of whiteness to create space for progressive interventions. 
Colbert’s closing comments also name another consequence of allowing universal white 
subjectivity to stand unchallenged as the center against which we measure pluralistic perspectives. More 
specifically, he accentuates how public discourses communicate “characteristics, roles, actions, or ways of 
seeing” to be avoided.43 Likewise, Colbert’s comedy exaggerates the familiar practice of validating white 
perspectives while abrogating perspectives such as Judge Sotomayor’s, and consequently, underscores the 
injury to people of color whose racialized experiences and perspectives are regularly dismissed and 
discounted. This lesson complements CRT’s consideration of the personal and spiritual experiences of 
racial injustice, what Patricia Williams calls “spirit murder,” the dehumanizing and assaultive dimensions 
of racism, marginalization, and invisibility. Legal proceedings and public discourse often exacerbate these 
consequences when victims must convince the court or the public of the legitimacy of their perspectives 
and lived experiences. Such practices result in a “devaluation of humanity” and remove people of color 
from the “pseudospiritual circle of psychic and civic communion.”44 As long as whiteness remains the 
privileged center, which negates and devalues other positions, these forms of racial oppression will persist. 
In addition to challenging neutrality and the injury of erasure, Colbert’s commentary advocates 
for marginalized voices. Taken in isolation, the editorial conclusion seems to validate continued 
marginalization and silencing, but in the context of the full comic text, Colbert’s advocacy for race-
consciousness emerges. He indirectly affirms CRT’s appeal to “look to the bottom” for silenced voices to 
enrich our political judgments.45 In addition, the comic editorial destabilizes the hegemonic orientation of 
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colorblindness and creates room for race-consciousness. Colbert advocates for the significance of 
racialized experience in establishing new modes of truth and public discourse. His comic commentary 
also supplements critical race scholarship’s efforts to “create conditions for the maintenance of a distinct 
political thought” informed by the perspectives and experiences of people of color and marginalized 
communities.46 
In short, this comic text can be more accurately understood via the shared aims of rhetorical and 
CRT scholarship. Colbert directs attention to the racially coded surfaces of society and implicit racial 
attitudes. He undermines both strategic rhetorics of white invisibility and whiteness’ privileged position of 
presumed neutrality. Through racial comedy, Colbert exaggerates many of the unexamined racialized 
ideologies informing our actions and judgments. He also foregrounds material realities of racialized 
experience including the psychological and spiritual consequences of silencing marginalized discourses. 
Highlighting these oppressive habits and realities that appear to be natural and fixed, Colbert provokes 
consciousness of their construction. In other words, this comic commentary “bring[s] to the surface the 
taken-for-granted assumptions that are embedded in both judicial and public spheres.”47 This 
destabilization opens space for counter-narratives and invites both the audience and communication 
scholars to create possibilities for new understandings of race and racism. 
Conclusion 
Communication scholars committed to racial justice must continue to engage CRT and 
simultaneously take seriously the transformative criticism emerging from comic discourses on race. 
Moreover, careful affiliation with CRT enhances communication scholars’ ability to amplify the comic 
discourses that deconstruct dominant, oppressive racial ideologies. Stephen Colbert’s commentary on 
now-Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor illustrates possibilities for extending ongoing, 
interdisciplinary communication scholarship on race. The task for critics is to join forces with such 
discourses and build upon the small victories won by comics who disrupt the hegemonic labor of 
whiteness. As demonstrated here, critical rhetorical scholarship bolstered by insights from CRT 
strengthens possibilities for progressive social transformation through sophisticated comic critiques.48 
In conclusion, I offer another brief example from The Boondocks by cartoonist Aaron McGruder. 
Eight-year-old Riley Freeman sits at a school desk. He appears bored and disinterested, his chin resting 
on crossed arms, a scowl on his face. Riley pays no attention to Phil, the student seated beside him. In 
contrast, an anxious and wary Phil glances nervously at Riley out of the corner of his eyes. In this first 
frame of this comic strip, McGruder portrays tenuous, racialized relationships. Phil, a white student, 
outwardly displays anxiety toward Riley, the black student beside him. Phil seems paralyzed by ingrained 
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fear and distrust. The second frame zooms in on the boys’ faces, highlighting Phil’s distress over Riley’s 
presence. Riley returns Phil’s gaze with a cocked eyebrow. In frame three Riley confronts Phil: “Is there a 
problem?” Phil’s mistrust reaches the tipping point. He cries out with tears in his eyes, “OOOOHHHH 
PLEASE DON’T HURT ME I DON’T HAVE ANY MONEY OK MAYBE A QUARTER BUT I’M 
TOO YOUNG TO DIE!!!!” The outburst confirms the message of Phil’s subtle performances: he 
perceives Riley as a menace, and he negatively judges Riley’s character and value. In the final frame, the 
teacher responds to Phil’s terrified outburst, “PHIL?! Phil, what’s wrong?! Riley, what have you done to 
Phil??!!!” Phil stutters, “M-Mrs. Peterson, can I go to the bathroom … please?” Riley begrudgingly rests 
his head back on the desk and stares away. His frustrated sigh suggests familiarity with incidents like this 
one. 
Like Colbert, McGruder’s critique of racialized experience complements the work of rhetorical 
scholars and critical race theorists. This scene demonstrates the consequences of internalized beliefs, 
attitudes, and values informed by a history of racial constructions. Phil reacts with fear and distrust to his 
perception of Riley’s black male identity. Mrs. Peterson, the authority figure, reveals her conditioned 
attitudes with a snap judgment of Riley’s guilt. This comic strip shows a young, black man devalued and 
rendered invisible through everyday interactions in what should be a safe space for learning and 
collaboration. Extending the story beyond these frames, critical race scholars might imagine Riley’s 
encounters with essentializing racial attitudes outside the classroom. The audience might also recognize a 
pattern of blaming people of color for educational and social disengagement. Multiple readings of this 
comedic text could yield even richer lessons. The point to be made, however, is that merging critical 
efforts can advance progressive critiques of racialized culture and generate opportunities to promote 
social transformation. 
To be sure, the uncertainty of humor carries a unique set of problems. In the case of Colbert’s 
satire, we cannot be certain that the audience will recognize the satire and some may simply accept his 
defense of white neutrality at face value. In the case of McGruder’s Boondocks, (white) readers with limited 
consciousness of the complexities of racial experience may identify strongly with Phil’s fear and the 
teacher’s dismissal. But all communication runs the risk of misappropriation and unpredictable outcomes. 
Thus, scholars committed to racial justice and social transformation have an even greater responsibility to 
direct the progressive potential of comic discourses on race. More directly asserted, communication 
scholars must take advantage of comic discourses in order to expand the scope of our critical projects and 
forge new pathways to justice. 
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